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Abstract 
 
For wireless communications, the FCC has fostered competition rather than 
openness. This has permitted the emergence of vertically integrated end-to-end 
providers, creating problems of reduced hardware innovation, software 
applications, user choice, and content access. To deal with these emerging issues 
and create multi-level forms of competition, one policy is likely to suffice: a 
Carterfone for wireless, coupled with more unlicensed spectrum.  
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The Wireless Policy Mess 
 
Openness is more than competition.  Competition means the ability of companies 
to contest each other and to seek customers’ business.  This can result in efficiency 
and enhanced consumer welfare.  But it can also result in a competition among 
bundled product packages instead of competition on a product-by-product basis.  
Openness, on the other hand, means the ability of competitors to access consumers 
directly rather through their own rivals. This is particularly an issue in network 
industries, and has been a constant theme of regulatory battles for over a century. 
In telecommunications, product and service markets were closed to competitors for 
a long time. For example, rival equipment makers existed domestically and 
internationally but could not reach customers of AT&T'’ network.  Telephone 
networks were opened first to customer equipment. Then it was long distance and 
international service.  Then, network equipment. Then, local telecommunications.  
It has now been extended to internet service over cable TV networks. But it has not 
yet reached wireless communications.  Here, competition has been fostered, but 
not openness. To the contrary, most trends of wireless policy are in the opposite 
direction.  But this is not well understood. 
 
In consequence, this article takes issue with the basic philosophy of the FCC’s 
wireless policy.  What makes this policy disturbing is: (a) that it does not seem to 
benefit from the positive impulses of other policy reforms; (b) that it cannot be 
explained as based on political constraints, as in the case of broadcast TV; and (c) 
that it largely focuses on carriers’ flexibility rather than users’ choice menu. 
 
It might be objected at the outset that wireless has been proceeding in the US by 
leaps and bounds, so why criticize an evident success story?  To be successful in 
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wireless is not very difficult.  Wireless is a success story everywhere in the world.  
Growth rates in Cambodia, Bulgaria, and Zimbabwe are phenomenal, too, and not 
necessarily due to enlightened government regulation, but rather due to a universal 
demand for ubiquitous communications and a supply of advanced signal processor 
chip technology.  Governments can hardly claim credit for these developments, 
though that has not stopped them, of course. 
 
In the US, if anything, government has been the brake, not the engine.  First, the 
original duopoly system for the analog first generation took many years to 
establish, and during that time the US lost its original technology head start to the 
Scandinavians, who still benefit from those early years.  It has been estimated that 
the delay cost the US $20 billion.  This is an underestimate, since it counts only 
lost carrier revenues, not lost consumer welfare, productivity gains, exports, and 
jobs. In Finland, meanwhile, Nokia accounts for one quarter of all national export 
earnings. 
 
When it came to the second generation of mobile communications, US policy was 
again painfully slow and complex.  Some of this cannot be helped, being due to a 
lawyer-saturated and player-congested environment, but partly it was self-inflicted.  
The reason was the creation of a system of spectrum allocation of mind-boggling 
complexity, whose aftermath is still winding its way to the Supreme Court, almost 
a decade later.  This system centered on spectrum auctions with upfront payments, 
a system much beloved to game-theorists without much knowledge of the wireless 
environment, by property rights ideologues, and by government officials eager to 
fill the empty coffers of government with windfall revenues. They sold long term 
assets for current consumption.  They sincerely believed that they had created an 
efficient form of allocation when in reality they established an extraordinary form 
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of entry barriers to new entrants, and an upfront entry tax on established companies 
which were given the choice, in effect, to pay or die.  I have discussed this in 
greater detail elsewhere.1 
 
The creation of this system generated costs of delay far in excess of any efficiency 
gains.  It permitted most of Europe and Japan to forge further ahead in technology, 
applications, and consumer satisfaction.  Many millions of i-mode or short 
messaging users roam the streets of Japan and of Europe, but not of the US.  This  
is not to claim that the US is a backward country when it comes to wireless. It is 
not. But one must note that in almost all other fields of communications the US is 
heavily dominant.  Why not in mobile wireless? This is, after all,  a which should 
be a natural field of leadership, given the American love affair with mobility and 
dependence on the automobile.  The one different variable is policy. The one 
pleasant exception is the emergence of a standard –CDMA—that has been a real 
advance.  But even this case benefited more from US defense technology than 
communications policy. 
 
In the now emerging third generation of wireless, US policy is again slow and 
uncertain.  Allocation of spectrum has been a near-farcical process of bargaining 
among entrenched industries and bureaucracies. Fortunately, the Europeans and 
Japanese have encountered problems of their own which permit us to pretend that 
we have engaged in a process of grave policy deliberation, instead of simply being 
unable to get our house in order.  It should also be noted that one of the main 
problems Europeans have encountered is due to the auction with upfront payment 
                                                 
1 See Noam, Eli M., “Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday’s Heresy, Today’s Orthodoxy, Tomorrow’s Anachronism.  
Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access,” The Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XLI part 2 pp. 765-790 
(October 1998). 
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process, a successful US export that had received the eager attention of European 
budget officials. 
 
Each of these setbacks can be explained.  Collectively, they raise the question if we 
are proceeding with the right strategy, or whether we have the fundamentally 
wrong approach. It is rare to find European telecommunications policy being more 
pro-openness and pro-consumer choice than American one2, but this is the case for 
wireless communications.  
 
 
American telecommunications and information policy has been at its strongest 
when it focused on consumer choice and on the lowering of entry barriers.  This 
translated to a willingness to let control over communications shift from the core of 
the network to the periphery, and for the core of the network to be competitive.  
The internet is the classic manifestation of this philosophy.  Its success, in contrast 
to government-sponsored, centralized, PTT-driven videotex operations such as the 
Minitel, btx, Captain, Prestel, etc, has demonstrated the fundamental strength of 
this model. 
 
It is therefore regrettable that it appears that the FCC has not applied the lessons 
from past successes to wireless, too.  But it is never too late.  A new crew is at the 
oars and tiller, and it might take a new look before it becomes responsible for 
another $20 billion plus in foregone future benefits. 
 
The Problem of Vertical Integration 
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Mobile communications are becoming the front-line communications device for 
most people.  Ubiquitous, always on.  In the recent attacks on American cities, it 
was used from airplanes, from under the rubble, as a substitute for congested 
landlines. Already, over 120 million Americans subscribe to cellphone service, 
almost as many as to wireline telephony.  It will soon overtake the latter, as it 
already has in several countries.  Wireless is moving into internet access, 
transactions, and media content.  It is becoming too important to ignore. 
 
The major problem with the emerging wireless environment is that it is vertically 
integrated in ways that are now unthinkable in other media.  Could one imagine a 
telephone carrier that can limit user access only to its own internet portal, that can 
select the websites accessible, that can control the type of telephone equipment its 
users are attaching, and the software these users are downloading? This has not 
been particularly clear in the past, where cell phones could be thought of as some 
kind of advanced cordless phone for the car.  But they are now becoming much 
more than that, and for more people.  
 
Furthermore, American cellular communications are ceasing to be a wide-open 
field.  Carriers have consolidated to 6 national footprints – AT&T, Cingular, 
Nextel (in regulatory terms not quite a cellular provider), Sprint, Verizon, and 
VoiceStream.  These companies use, between themselves, 5 different standards, 
one of them the analog AMPS that is on its way out; and four digital standards --
TDMA, CDMA, GSM, and IDEN.  These carriers are widely expected to further 
consolidate into four firms.  They are likely to continue using several different 
standards, with only limited transferability of handset equipment among carriers.  
Customers are therefore limited in the ability to easily switch carriers.  These 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 See Eli M. Noam, Telecommunications in Europe, Oxford University Press, 1988. 
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different standards create consumer lock-in, and permit each of the carriers to 
maintain a stronger market power over its customers. Competition in technology 
has, ironically, reduced carrier competition for consumers. 
 
The main characteristic of the wireless business, which affords the carriers such 
lock-in over its customers, is vertical integration.  The customer is a contractual 
subscriber who is served vertically by a wireless carrier that provides a full set of 
services. The basic components of a wireless operation are graphed in the 
following: 
 
Graph 1. 
 
 
The user reaches his carrier via his terminal (handset) and the carrier’s allocated 
frequencies.  The call is then routed via a fixed network to the recipient.  More 
recently, this has been extended to route internet-style communications to a 
wireless portal that links into transactions and content. 
 
The key component to this system is the spectrum allocation.  It enables the carrier 
to control downstream the terminal equipment and access of a subscriber, and 
leverage this position of “owning the customer” upstream to the other steps of this 
chain.   
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In consequence, we are quite used to the notion that the carrier: 
 
· Selects, markets, and approves the customer handsets and connects it to its 
network 
· Provides, selects, and adopts many of the features, capabilities, and content 
resident on the handset 
· Operates the wireless portion of the communications path 
· Operates or provides the local fixed line distribution 
· Operates or selects the long distance and international carrier 
· Selects, for areas in which it does not provide service itself, a partner mobile 
carrier that services the subscriber, at rates negotiated and billed by itself 
· Provides software-defined functionalities on the network 
· Selects and approves services resident on the network and provided by itself 
or by third parties 
· Controls the access to a wireless portal, its content and features, of the 
providers linked by that portal, and of the placement of these links 
 
There is nothing wrong with a carrier offering all of these components in a bundled 
fashion.  However, when there is no alternative to taking the entire bundle or major 
parts of it, several problems are inevitable.  One can readily recognize good old 
friends, issues that have bedeviled fixed line telephony and cable television:  
 
· The reduction or lack of customer choice in applications and content 
inherent in a vertical integration with no or limited alternatives 
· The reduction in innovation of service provision due to the closed nature of 
the applications and software that can be offered by third parties 
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· The absence of choice for customers to use, where more advantageous, 
alternative wireless arrangements are possible, such as wireless LANs, other 
carriers for roaming, or stronger signals of another carrier 
· Market power with respect to vendors of m-commerce, and requirements on 
such vendors to become business partners 
· Selectivity over content, which would be particularly troubling if the 
wireless medium would become a mass medium with video, audio, and text 
· Restrictiveness in the inter-carrier transfer of instant messaging. 
 
These problems will now be analyzed in greater detail.  
 
 
The Problems of Non-Openness 
 
1. Reduction of Choice among cellular service providers 
 
Right now, cell phone users enter into a service agreement with a single carrier.  
That carrier accepts all of their calls, or reaches them in the case of incoming calls.  
Where the user is outside the service territory of the carrier, the user gets serviced 
by another carrier in a “roaming” arrangement.  The roaming-partner carrier is 
selected by the primary carrier in a commercial agreement (a “preferred” roaming 
arrangement).  The call could also be picked up whichever carrier is around (a 
“general” roaming partner, typically a set of carriers, with prices set industry-
wide).  The third type of arrangement is based on signal strength, where the 
roaming goes to the strongest signal in that area, unless there is a primary or 
general roaming agreement, which would override.  Whatever the arrangement, the 
user has no choice in the matter, in contrast to the arrangement in GSM countries, 
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where a caller can select the roaming carrier and override its primary carrier’s 
choice. 
 
In the US, this choice is further limited by the different wireless protocols used by 
carriers.  A user of a carrier operating on the CDMA standard cannot roam, in 
technical terms, on a TDMA or GSM carrier.  A limited number of handsets can 
use both TDMA and GSM since they are related.  But on the whole, the ability to 
switch to a carrier using another standard is minimal.  In contrast, in GSM 
countries users can easily take their handset to any other carrier. 
 
Furthermore, it is impossible to subscribe to more than one carrier using a single 
handset.  For example, if a user spent much of his time in both New York and 
Atlanta, and no company serviced both cities, he might want to subscribe to 
companies in both cities rather than pay expensive roaming charges. However, 
there is presently no practical possibility to switch between two carriers.  In theory, 
something exists called “dual NAM” that would permit dual-carrier subscriptions.  
In practice, however, phone inquiries to several major carriers did not reveal the 
availability of such arrangements.   
 
Also in theory, a reseller or reseller group could resell the services of more than 
one carrier or service type. This assumes that permission would be granted by the 
carriers whose service is being resold, which is not likely if they refused to permit 
such choice for their direct customers. 
 
This lack of choice has real implications.  Roaming calls are quite expensive, and 
are not part of the subscriber’s “bucket” of minutes.  They are a major 
moneymaker for carriers.   
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The main problem here is not technology but resistance to competition.  Once a 
user can switch freely among carriers, where will it end?  A user might regularly 
drive through some areas where the signal of his primary carrier is missing, and 
then select another carrier that performs better. Next, a user might switch to a 
carrier who offers her the lowest rate during that time period.  Soon, the user would 
be able to engage in “least cost routing”.  This means that there might be 
automated competition for every call, as opposed to the present system of 
competition for the subscription.  
 
2. Absence of Choice Among different Wireless Services 
 
In the past, cellular phone service constituted an end-to-end service, separate from 
those of others.  However, other wireless services are also being offered.  Paging 
has long been a widespread service, and smart paging via narrowband PCS has 
gained increasing popularity.  An example is the BlackBerry pager for always-on 
email.  Some such services are being offered on cellphone terminals, but only 
using its cellphone frequencies, as opposed to being able to switch to the service 
provided by another paging company. Furthermore, a cell phone terminal could 
conceivably be used as a terminal for a cordless phone at home or at the office, 
directly without going through the wireless network.  Similarly, it could be used as 
a “walkie-talkie” between several other cell phones in a neighborhood, again 
without going through the actual network.  (This is a popular feature provided by 
Nextel for its own subscribers).  It could be a terminal to the type of data services 
pioneered by Ricochet. The cell phone terminal could also bypass the wireless 
network through wireless local area networks (WLANs).  Or, the cell phone 
terminal could be used as a radio receiver for broadcast programs, a scanner for 
 12
police frequencies, etc.  It is time to think of what we now call the cellphone 
handset as a future general multi-purpose wireless terminal.  
 
Such multi-purpose terminals would be a threat to most cellular carriers. To see 
that, let us consider the case of wireless Public and Private Wireless LANs that are 
emerging on college campuses, airports, office parks, coffee house chains like 
Starbucks, apartment house complexes, and planes and trains.  (cite Bertil 
Thorngren).  These networks, operating on unlicensed spectrum, already reach 
wireless speeds of up to 11 Mbps two-way communications, and can service, in 
principle, any type of wireless device, whether laptops, PDAs, pagers, or mobile 
phones.  They follow the 802.111.b standard advanced by Apple, or the Bluetooth 
standard whose range is more limited. 
 
These new services are a major threat to carriers planning to offer 3G services.  In 
Europe, these carriers are spending vast amounts of money for licenses and 
infrastructure, yet the most lucrative markets might be cream-skimmed by low-
cost, unlicensed, high-speed WLAN providers.  It is not too much to state that the 
very survival of some of the traditional carriers depends on making their 3G 
investments a success.  Their strategies will include offering WLANs themselves.  
But where that market is open and unconstrained, competition will be a major 
threat.  
 
The first defensive strategy would be to induce the government to raise the entry 
barriers by requiring the entire panoply of spectrum licenses, upfront auctions, and 
national/regional bidding instead of local ones, to raise cost and induce delay.  
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The second defensive strategy would be to reduce the ability of users to connect 
into WLANs.  This would be done by preventing users to connect their wireless 
devices into both the carriers’ cellular networks and into the WLANs.  They could 
accomplish this by refusing to connect such multi-mode equipment to their 
networks. 
 
Here, until very recently, the FCC was on their side.  For a variety of reasons, the 
FCC refused to license equipment that could function for multiple different 
services.  As Michael Marcus observes, a ham radio could not be used as a marine 
radio, etc.  As it happens, however, the FCC has reversed this course that had been 
embarrassingly at variance with its after-lunch rhetoric of flexibility.  On 
September 13, 2001, the FCC adopted rules on software defined radios (SDRs).3  
These rules have moved a great step forward in flexibility.  They permit radios 
whose operating parameters are determined by software—which could be almost 
any radio these days, if the rules are interpreted generously-- to operate on multiple 
standards and services.   
 
This initiative has been much to the credit of the FCC.  It has the potential to 
subvert the present carrier-centric regulatory approach. With software-defined 
radios receiving legal backing, multi-service transceivers will inevitably emerge.  
Under present rules, however, the carriers would not have to connect such 
equipment.  They ultimately control which equipment can access their networks, 
and the potential for such equipment to be left stranded will retard its development.  
This will be developed further below. 
 
3. Control Over the Approval of Handsets Reduces Innovation and Choice 
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At present, the approval of handsets by carriers and by the FCC is a two- or even 
three-stage process.  The FCC (and similar regulatory bodies elsewhere) issues 
specifications regarding the radio (RF) and health aspects (SAR)of equipment.  
This includes frequency, power, and radiation.  Some of this is based on self-
certification (by way of verification, or declaration of conformity after testing by 
accredited labs).  In other cases, involving higher risk equipment, equipment must 
be submitted for testing by the FCC or licensed private Telecommunications 
Certifications Bodies.  There are also issues of non-access to certain frequencies 
for transmission.  For example, only licensed pilots can buy transmission 
equipment for aviation frequencies. 
 
At present, the approval of handsets by carriers and by the FCC is a two- or even 
three-stage process.   
 
These stages involve the air interface standards that govern the transmission from 
the handset to the base station, such as CDMA (technical standard IS 95), TDMA 
(IS 136), I-Den, and GSM.  These standards are set by a variety of manufacturer-
driven groupings.  The decision whether to approve a particular handset for 
connectivity, however, lies within the discretion of the carrier, since that carrier is 
entirely free, in the US, to select its standard.  In Europe, in contrast, any 
equipment that complies with the GSM specifications will be connected to the 
network.  There is no carrier discretion.  In the US, the industry association CTIA 
often certifies a manufacturer’s equipment to the industry, but each carrier can add 
its own requirements and flavor of specifications.  In consequence, large carriers 
also test and approve equipment for connection to their network.  Hence, the mere 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 FCC, Authorization and Use of Software Defined Radios, ET Docket No 00-47. 
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adherence by a manufacturer to the standard specifications in the US is not enough.  
It must also find favor with the carrier.  There is no right to use equipment to 
connect to a cellular network. 
 
The carrier’s business calculus on what equipment to approve is based on a variety 
of factors. Since in the US, in contrast to Europe or Japan, the carrier rather than 
the consumer buy most handsets, low cost is a major factor, as would be 
serviceability, ability to maintain a limited inventory, and independence from a 
single source.  In addition to reducing the choice available to users, this system 
also makes manufacturers somewhat dependent on large carriers.  They would not 
lightly put equipment into the marketplace that would be disfavored by the carriers 
as threatening their basic business by facilitating access to services such as WLAN 
that compete with the business of their best customers. 
 
4. The Usefulness of User Equipment is Limited by Closed Operating 
Systems Software 
 
Beyond the question of whether multi-services equipment can be licensed and 
connected is the question of control over the nature of the terminals themselves.  
As handsets become smarter, they begin to resemble small computers.  To 
function, they now begin to incorporate operating system software.  At present, 
there are four initiatives in that direction. Participants include: 
 
· Microsoft (not surprisingly), with its Stinger, in cooperation with 
Samsung and Sendo, an UK-based handset maker. 
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· Symbian, a joint venture of most cellphone makers resisting a 
Microsoft dominance, with its Epoc.  They include Ericsson, Nokia, 
Motorola, Matsushita, Sony, Psion (software), Kenwood, and IBM. 
· eCos.  This is one of several Linux-based open-source operating 
system concepts, this one from Red Hat, 3G Labs, and others.  At 
present it is more of a concept than a reality.  Manufacturers other 
than Qualcomm have been reluctant to engage in this non-proprietary 
environment. 
· J2ME. (Java version 2, micro edition). This concept, too, encourages 
openness, though it is not non-proprietary in the way that Linux is. 
 
The important thing to understand is that the choice of the operating system pre-
determines the openness of the applications software.  With Stinger or Epoc, the 
carriers and manufacturers would be able to control the types of software 
applications loaded onto the handsets.  With eCos and J2ME, they could not.  
Hence, open approaches would be preferred by those carriers eager to promote a 
great diversity of applications.  They would favor manufacturers adopting these 
operating systems. Others, perhaps more concerned—legitimately-- with quality 
control of applications, security against viruses, and with the increased bargaining 
strength it gives them over applications developers and third-party applications 
service providers, would not favor equipment that is open to software, and hence 
would favor manufacturers who select the closed operating software. 
 
As wireless networks begin to offer increasingly higher-level services, the question 
of who may load what applications onto a handset, and what network-based service 
interfaces these applications may access becomes important.  Is a user restricted to 
only the applications that are offered by his primary service provider, or may he 
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load other applications?  Furthermore, can these applications have full access to the 
functions of the network and the handset?  These questions may be best illustrated 
with three examples, due to Kevin Kahn.  
 
1. Suppose a brokerage wants to offer a handset application that uses the screen 
and the alerting (sound or vibration) capabilities of a handset to provide a service 
to its client.  This application requires that the code at the handset have access to 
the APIs that access the handset functions and it also requires that the service have 
access through the network to get messages to that application.  Does deployment 
of such an application require the cooperation of the wireless service provider?  In 
today’s Internet, deployment of such an application on an end system PC would 
not require any support from the ISP – will the same be true for wireless? 
 
2. As a second example, suppose a company wishes to deploy a universal 
messaging application that can alert users to any messages, email or voice, that 
they have on any of a number of message queuing services.  This application 
requires access to the alerting indicators of the handset and it may also require 
access to the voicemail service inherent in the wireless providers service so that 
messages queued there can be included in the new service.  Do the necessary APIs 
and addressing paths exist to allow such an application. 
 
3. As a final example, suppose a vending machine with an infrared or Bluetooth 
interface that wants to interact with a handset to communicate with a backend 
billing service to handle the vending.  This requires a digital certificate to be sent 
from the machine through the handset to the backend service followed by an 
authorization certificate being sent back via the same path to the machine.  Again, 
this requires the application to have access to specific functions of the handset 
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(probably the IR port, the screen to present selections, and the buttons to select).  
Can this application be deployed without cooperation of the wireless service 
provider? 
 
5. Closed Portals Reduce User Choice 
 
Under the presently evolving system, the user reaches a wireless portal, whence 
she can be connected to a variety of other sites.  The selection and placement of 
these links, however, is under the control of the carrier.  Other portals might be 
accessed, but that requires additional clicks.  This situation is very similar to the 
one discussed for cable television’s access to portals other than those of the cable 
company or its partner.  It has led, in the US, to requirements on Time Warner 
Cable to open its system to several service providers/portals.  Similar rules are 
being contemplated for the entire cable industry.  These issues are well known and 
require no recapitulation. Virtually the same arguments on both sides apply also to 
cell phone access to portals, and through them, to the broader internet. It should be 
noted, however, anticipating the conclusion of this paper, that they are much easier 
to resolve to the wireless medium. 
 
6. Transactions and Content are Limited.  
 
The wireless carrier’s portal is not a common carrier.  Hence, the selection of  
websites, e-vendors, and content providers is entirely that of the carrier.  Its 
selection would be based on its own economic, cultural, and political 
considerations.  Being a selector, it would also incur some legal liability, which 
would further increase caution. 
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Even where there might be a wide set of links, such as in the case of Japan’s NTT 
DoCoMo and its i-mode portal, such openness can be affected by differentiating 
policies.  DoCoMo has preferential arrangements with a small number of its 
partner sites, and handles their billing through the users’ phone bill.  In contrast, 
the majority of other sites must arrange for their own billing, putting them at some 
disadvantage.  This provides DoCoMo with some leverage over its primary 
partners. 
 
The absence of openness resembles the “walled garden” arrangements of some 
Internet portals provided by cable companies.  Correspondingly, we can term this 
arrangement the “walled airwave” system. 
 
Implications for Public Policy 
 
The previous section has identified the potential for real problems. But the 
recognition of such issues does not mean that regulatory approaches are needed.  A 
vigorous competition among mobile carriers could overcome most issues and 
generate unbundling through market forces.  At the same time, the ability to 
exercise market power with respect to mobile commerce providers or wireless 
LANs might be common to all mobile providers and more profitable than a more 
open system. In such a case, market forces might not lead to unbundling.  
 
The knee-jerk response to the problems identified in this paper is that competition 
will take care of it.  But suppose that carriers would be consistently worse off by 
offering consumers the choice of moving easily around to other carriers or service 
providers.  Such competition would reduce prices and profitability.  It would, on 
the other hand, grow the market.  But it is quite likely that each carrier would be 
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better off servicing a less competitive slice of a smaller market, rather than 
engaging in greater competition in a larger market.  
 
It is not clear why a carrier A would be the first to offer such choice to its 
customers.  After all, it would provide an exit to its own customers, without a 
potential compensating gain from the customers of the other carriers B and C.  The 
main reason would be to hope for enough users of B and C to switch their 
subscriptions to A in order to have the choice of not using A.  This can hardly be a 
strong selling point.  Furthermore, any choice requires the consent and cooperation 
of B and C, which might not be forthcoming once they realize that they are 
opening the door to a mutually destabilizing competition. They will be concerned 
with reputation effects if they are blamed in users’ mind with poor performance 
caused by an element not under their direct control. And they might be able to use 
bundling as a way to price discriminate, as George Stigler has pointed out in a 
different context. The likelihood of oligopolistic behavior within a small group of 
carriers is high. As the number of competitors shrinks, each has less to gain and 
more to lose by maverick behavior. It is also an inhibitor for any software 
developer to take initiatives for new applications if the market is largely closed, 
and this further reduces the attractiveness of any non-conforming behavior be a 
carrier. 
 
Where market forces do not work, would regulation? Let us look at several 
potential points of intervention and evaluate their need. 
   
 
A schematic view of an unbundled wireless network environment is provided in 
Graph 2.  It shows, at each stage of the chain of wireless provision, alternative 
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providers. We will consider “openness” at several points, and conclude that only 
one of them – the openness of the terminal equipment to access multiple providers 
of wireless services and providers-- is critical. A subsidiary second opening –
unlicensed spectrum—supports such policy. This is discussed in the following. 
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Graph 2 
 
 
1. The Separation of the User Equipment (UE) From the Carrier. 
 
Such a policy would amount to a ‘Carterfone’ policy for users’ wireless 
equipment.  While the carrier could still offer and market its preferred equipment, 
it could not exclude other equipment, as long as it conforms to certain technical 
specifications pertaining to the RF transceiving function and non-discriminatory 
industry specifications for air interfaces standards.  These specifications could not 
close equipment third-party applications or access to other network protocols 
offered by other types of providers, as long as it conforms to the FCC’s software 
defined radio rules. 
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While a fully bundled service could be offered by a carrier as before, the carrier 
could not prevent a user of selecting, for any given call, another wireless service 
provider or use the equipment for other communications purposes. 
 
The significance of such arrangement is that equipment will be offered by the 
market that adds features, and, more importantly, permits a user to select service 
providers depending on circumstances.  For example, a user in a shopping mall, 
campus, office building, or airport could connect to a wireless LAN.  A user 
encountering a circuit busy could switch to another carrier.  A user seeking to 
receive synchronous music, radio style, could do so by accessing a specialized 
broadcaster. 
 
This choice would reduce the need for most other access requirements, since the 
user would not be tied to a single carrier with significant costs of switching to 
another.  This is partly embodied in the GSM standard which provides some user 
selectivity over carriers, though the approval of such alternatives remains with the 
primarily carrier, which also handles the billing. 
 
This approach would be similar to that adopted by the FCC for CPE following the 
Carterfone decision in 1968. It followed Cassandra warnings of impending 
network chaos, but has worked spectacularly well.  
 
2. Access to Unlicensed Spectrum.  
 
The key source of leverage for carriers is the high entry barrier for new and future 
entrants in service provision, due to the spectrum auctioning system with its 
advance payment feature.  Given the difficulty in freeing additional spectrum and 
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the high cost of aquiring it, it seems unlikely that there would be new entrants 
emerging to challenge the reduced group of carriers. Therefore, government should 
additionally provide adequate spectrum on a license-free basis, with users and 
service providers paying for usage rather than for ownership, in the way that 
automobiles pay for the use of highways. This has been developed in detail by the 
author in other papers.4 Once such spectrum is available, and once users’ terminals 
can access service providers such as WLANs operating on such spectrum, users 
will not be constrained by the limited choice of maybe four cellular carriers that 
could still collectively be restrictive. 
 
3. Access to Alternative Wireless Portals.  
 
The third access issue is that to the wireless portal.  The issues here are similar to 
those discussed for the cable industry.  The similar arrangement would mean that 
the wireless carrier would let the user pre-select its primary portal, or that several 
such portals would be accessible at no extra effort, or that the two upper layers of 
the carrier portal would be open to third parties.  This approach would mirror the 
open access of the internet, and the approaches now being applied to AOL Time 
Warner, and considered by the FCC in its proceedings. 
 
Content openness may be the easiest type of openness to consider since it is 
essentially a browser level openness.  The question can be reduced to whether the 
user can enter an arbitrary URL to a network portal to access content (independent 
of any business deal between the wireless provider and particular content 
providers) and whether browser plug-ins can be created and downloaded to render 
                                                 
4 See Noam, Eli M., “Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday’s Heresy, Today’s Orthodoxy, Tomorrow’s Anachronism.  
Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access,” The Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XLI part 2 pp. 765-790 
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the resulting content if required.  This issue is analogous to the walled garden 
discussions that have occurred in the wired internet. 
 
This problem would largely go away if the users could access,  through their 
handsets linked to other carriers and wireless providers, also other portals and 
websites. 
 
4. Openness of the carrier’s network 
 
The fourth element of openness relates to services offered by third parties and 
requiring presence in the wireless network itself.  The options are either to keep 
wireless networks closed to third parties, or total openness, resembling a common 
carrier access for third party software applications, or a type of  equipment 
collocation that exists in telecommunications. Here, too, would the ability to access 
alternative wireless carriers through flexible handsets be enough to deal with this 
issue. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The focus of the FCC policy has been to provide carriers with choice—in the 
utilization of he licensed frequency, in the technical specifications of it service, in 
its pricing, etc.  There does not seem to have been a similar orientation towards 
choice of the users, broadly defined as consumers and providers of various 
attached services.  The implicit notion was that by providing carriers with options, 
and creating competition, users will be well served.  And that certainly goes a long 
way. But carriers are likely to resist offering consumers the choice of moving 
                                                                                                                                                             
(October 1998). 
 26
easily around to other carriers or service providers.  Such competition would 
reduce prices and profitability.  
 
The conclusion of the analysis is that the key point of openness, and arguably the 
only one needed, is that of openness of user equipment.  With this openness 
achieved, the user would have alternative avenues to spectrum, content, portals, 
etc. A secondary  policy would be to assure alternative wireless pathways such as 
WLANs by providing an adequate amount of unlicensed spectrum. 
 
Why is all this important? The overall goal of the openness approach described 
above is to establish for the wireless environment the same dynamism shown in the 
internet, encouraging hardware and software innovation and applications.  Right 
now this is a dynamic sector, mostly based on the growth of penetration. Soon, 
however, this growth will plateau as universal wireless connectivity is being 
approached. At that point, we need the impetus for further innovation that a more 
open system provides. For the carriers, the overall positive impact in terms of 
traffic generation may well outweigh some loss of control.  For users, service 
providers, and technology developers, the advantages of openness might be 
significant.  
 
American communications policy has fared best when it puts its faith in the 
dynamism of the periphery of the network, instead of seeking to strengthen the 
ability of the network core to dominate.  Wireless is no exception.  And the 
mediocre results of policies focusing on the core, in contrast to those for other parts 
of the communications environment, suggest that a reorientation is in order. The 
key step now is to follow the opening set by the FCC’s for software defined radio 
 27
by a Carterfone-style opening to equipment that can access multiple wireless 
networks. 
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